How a frog got boiled slowly
Moral hazard is defined as: “ when a party insulated from risk may behave differently than it would behave if it were fully exposed to the risk”.
You may ask: what does this have to do with the second title in the heading?
Well, I remember from my biology class this experiment (and this experiment should be part of every MBA program to illustrate moral hazard)
A frog immersed in a hot pot of water, will jump out as its senses indicate the contrast and hence danger of the hot or boiling water—the frog’s senses serve as a protective mechanism.
A frog immersed in a cool pot of water will remain in this pot even if the water reaches boiling point—the protective mechanism we talked about earlier failed. The mechanism could not distinguish a contrast, as the water warming gradually did not trigger the protective mechanism—fatal for the frog.
Currently, this hazard is starkly illuminated in the Goldman Sachs (GS) situation, he bank bailouts, the rating agencies and their AAA ratings of junk, the Euro-zone country debt issues. There are likely to be more (take derivatives for example). I will say more on that later.
The principal issue is that in all cases agents have acted as though risks where minimal, minimized, or non-existent.
GS hedged their exposure against what is now a junk CDO market. Rating Agencies have manipulated their assessments (massaged is the more sexy term) until a cheesy bond, CDO, or other debt instrument looked like a bearer bond with interest on steroids. Countries, assuming their bigger, more solvent and financially prudent brothers—Germany, France—would bail them out. The banking crisis of course has shown what happens there.
This raises the following questions:
1. Are banks too big too fail?
2. Are country economies too big to fail?
3. Has anyone defined Fail?
4. Has moral hazard been addressed?
1. Banks are not too big to fail. Letting them fail and then recreating some similar functioning entity—without the debt burden—in my view now would reduce moral hazard. Or the bank is nationalized with debt write-off of toxic assets
The prime example of this is the incredible profitability of some banks shortly after the banking crisis, which could lead a bank to assume things are back to normal. But normal was what lead to the banking crisis.
Letting banks fail—no matter what size—would send the message of: “take excessive risk and you may fail!”
2. Country economies have always taken some options such as devaluation, default, and other mechanisms to extricate from debt servicing problems.
The issue in the Euro-Zone is primarily that some countries did not manage their budget very well (in some cases they may have concealed or dressed up the problem) and now the day of reckoning has come.
Greece as the first country needing action has the option of defaulting, which would affect its credit rating to raise debt and, ultimately would be forced to spend less.
A rescue plan would simply increase the moral hazard of spendthrift—the legal remedy is of course declaring bankruptcy.
A devaluation of the currency would have a similar effect, as imports would now decline and exports for trade purposes become more attractive—painful if you want to buy a BMW but eating Kalamata olives would still work. The problem is Greece does not buy in Drachmas anymore so the problem can be solved only through default.
3. Failure, if we use the Frog analogy, can and likely has occurred before we realize what is failure. In other words because we ignore moral hazard for all sorts of reasons (Greed, ignorance, false assumptions…) the system is failing well before it breaks down.
Hence a way to determine or highlight failing parts of financial systems may give us the warning signs before all hell breaks loose.
4. Has Moral hazard been addressed in the scenarios mentioned. He answer right now is a resounding NO!